SUBMERSIBLES AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS
The four crewmen aboard the self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) 2 appeared to be well aware that they could avoid criminal prosecution if they destroyed all evidence of their drug trafficking before law enforcement officials arrived. 3 As the boarding team neared the SPSS, the crew opened the scuttling valves to sink the fiber-glassed submersible. 4 However, the Coast Guard was fortunate in this case; the crewmembers were unable to scuttle the eleven bales of cocaine valued at more than $350 million, though they did manage to sink their vessel before the boarding team arrived.
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2. SPSS refers to self-propelled semi-submersibles; SPFS refers to self-propelled fully-submersibles. For purposes of this article only, the term SPSS may refer to both SPSS and SPFS vessels. Definitions of SPSS and SPFS are provided in the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act of 2008, discussed in detail below.
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maritime law enforcement today,'" but noted that without a law proscribing the operation of these platforms, narco-traffickers often avoid criminal consequences.
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The United States closed the legal gap in 2008 with the passage of the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act (DTVIA) . 12 This federal statute criminalizes the operation of fully submersible or semisubmersible vessels that are without nationality 13 and are navigating or have navigated outside of a nation's territorial sea with the intent to evade detection.
14 Essentially, the conveyance was outlawed regardless of its contents.
At present, dozens of defendants have been convicted under the DTVIA, yet scant legal review of DTVIA's constitutionality, either academically or judicially, existed prior to four Eleventh Circuit opinions issued in the first half of 2011. 15 In these cases, the courts considered whether the DTVIA exceeds congressional authority, whether its application violates due process, whether its text is too vague, and whether the statute improperly shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. Although limited in number, these rulings provide guidance for addressing other asymmetric maritime threats that are increasingly transnational, complex, and lethal.
This Article examines the economic and environmental incentives that led to the development of semi-and fully-submersibles, the DTVIA's legislative history and enactment, the issues raised in the appellate cases that affirmed the Act's constitutionality, and the unresolved legal and operational issues to address the SPSS threat. 16 Part II details the international narco-trafficking business and the rise of the SPSS as a drug-smuggling tool, as well as the logistical difficulties faced by drug enforcement agencies. Part III discusses the existing domestic and international efforts to confront the international drug trade. Part IV outlines the swift congressional response to the SPSS threat-the DTVIA. In turn, Part V examines the judicial review of appeals arising out of the DTVIA.
II. THE DRUG CHALLENGE
Nearly 8,000 people a day use drugs illegally for the first time in the United States alone. 17 And, a United Nations' study pegs the global number of illicit drug users at more than 200 million and rising. 18 Supplying this market depends on smuggling illicit drugs across oceans and national borders and generates an estimated $320 billion annually. 16. This article does not examine social policy issues related to countering illicit narcotics threats.
See GLOBAL COMM'N ON DRUG POLICY, WAR ON DRUGS (2011), available at http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/Report, for a discussion of social policy issues related to drug use. The report notes that
[w]hen the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs came into being 50 years ago, and when President Nixon launched the US government's war on drugs 40 years ago, policymakers believed that harsh law enforcement action against those involved in drug production, distribution and use would lead to an ever-diminishing market in controlled drugs such as heroin, cocaine and cannabis, and the eventual achievement of a 'drug free world'. In practice, the global scale of illegal drug markets -largely controlled by organized crime -has grown dramatically over this period . . . . [Thus, t]he starting point for . . . review is the recognition of the global drug problem as a set of interlinked health and social challenges to be managed, rather than a war to be won. In discussing the global market for illicit drugs, the report states: " [f] or all the caveats that one may put on such a figure, [$320 billion] . . . it is still larger than the individual GDPs Among illicit drugs, cocaine distribution is particularly lucrative. For example, while the wholesale value of a kilogram of cocaine in Peru and Colombia is approximately $1,300 and $2,300, respectively, the same kilogram yields approximately $27,000 in the United States, $60,000 in Europe, $150,000 in Russia, and more than $170,000 in Saudi Arabia.
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Some narcotics are produced and distributed locally and regionally, while others, such as cocaine, move globally. 21 Transporting products to more profitable destinations without detection is key, and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) operating in South America recognize the value of the oceans as critical routes, given the anonymity a ship enjoys over large, ungoverned stretches of space, the relative complexities in jurisdiction, and the limited capacity of most countries' coastal law enforcement.
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The oceans also pose considerable operational, communications, and logistics challenges. Overcoming those hurdles has enabled the TCOs' business model to remain strong even though more than 1.6 million drug seizure cases occurred globally in 2006 and 1.5 million in 2005, resulting in the interdiction of more than 700 metric tons of cocaine, among other drugs, in each of those years. 23 of nearly 90% of the countries of the world. This is not a small enemy against which we struggle. It is a monster." Id.
20 Although the cost of constructing a submersible vessel is higharound $2 million-those costs are mitigated by the fact that such vessels can transport several tons of cocaine in one voyage. 24 Thus, as a result of the tremendously higher street value of cocaine in areas outside of Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia, a TCO could " [d] eploy five vessels at a combined total lay out of $100 million, successfully deliver one, and you double your investment." 25 Stopping vessels before they get underway is certainly preferable, but because the construction and deployment of SPSS platforms occur in rough, rural, and isolated terrain, doing so is not always possible.
26 This is, in part, due to the fact that smugglers are "constantly adapting their techniques to counter U.S. law enforcement activities." 27 Domestic guidance for boarding authorities includes an array of statutes, case law, and ship boarding agreements between the United States and more than thirty other nations. 40 However, the seminal U.S. criminal statute on narcotics trafficking is the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 41 which addresses nexus 42 and jurisdiction, among other issues. Although the MDLEA superseded the Marijuana on the High Seas Act (MHSA), 43 both Acts enabled prosecutions for illicit conduct occurring beyond the U.S. territorial sea on vessels that may or may not be registered in the United States, recognizing the global drug Both Acts also stoked considerable academic and judicial review. 45 The MDLEA establishes jurisdiction for U.S. law enforcement officials over: the trafficking of controlled substances that occurs on the high seas and in a foreign state's territorial sea, with the consent of the coastal nation; 46 U.S. registered vessels; foreign-flagged vessels with the consent of the flag state; 47 and stateless vessels.
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The MDLEA thus created a framework to enable U.S. prosecutions, under certain conditions, for maritime drug trafficking occurring virtually anywhere on earth.
The MDLEA provides that "[j]urisdiction with respect to a vessel subject to this chapter is not an element of an offense. Jurisdictional issues arising under this chapter are preliminary questions of law to be determined solely by the trial judge." 49 [t]he Act makes clear that persons arrested in international waters will not be able to challenge the arrest on the ground that the vessel was of foreign registry unless such claim was affirmatively and unequivocally verified by the nation of registry when the vessel was targeted for boarding. By eliminating this commonly raised jurisdictional defense, the Act strengthens the hand of prosecutors in drug smuggling cases. States to prosecute crimes committed by stateless vessels.
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To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would allow such vessels to become "floating sanctuaries from authority." 55 Jurisdictional clarity is significant in legally combating cocaine transits, which, along with heroin, comprise the majority of long-distance trafficking.
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Other drugs are primarily sold either domestically or regionally, but the surging use of the SPSS to transport drugs, along with the possibility of other illicit cargo, prompted legislative interest.
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B. Collaboration
Successful pursuit of submersibles requires multilateral collaboration because the operating environment is simply too large for any nation to address individually. 58 Similarly, partnering against narco-trafficking is critical and unfolds in multiple forums. 59 Although language barriers, training, equipment, and the level of political support represent challenges, a shared commitment exists in combating drug trafficking.
In addition, domestic legal authority and judicial capacity are critical to effectively pursuing narco-traffickers and other illicit maritime threats. 60 Documented submersible events clearly declined in 2010, though the platform continues to be regularly used by TCOs and remains a transnational threat. 75 The submersible became an attractive platform not just because of legal gaps, but also because of the challenges in identifiing and tracking such a vessel:
The SPSS is effective because it combines the most desirable aspects of two historically successful methods of conveyancethe go-fast and the fishing vessel -while adding new dimensions to the drug challenge. Similar to the go-fast, its low profile is difficult to detect. Better than the go-fast, its range offers greater flexibility in planning potential drop locations. Similar to a fishing vessel, it has the capacity to carry larger, more profitable payloads. Better than a fishing vessel, traffickers launch them in secrecy, denying actionable intelligence that stymies counterdrug efforts. 75. See OFFICE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 7, at 8. The reduction in documented SPSS events could be partially based on the increased operational focus by domestic law enforcement and foreign law enforcement efforts, as well as the passage of recent legislation providing for greater enforcement jurisdiction.
76. Wilkenson, supra note 8. By filling fuel tanks with seawater as they empty, they maintain a steady, ultra-low profile that makes them nearly impossible to spot by eye at any distance over one nautical mile. . . . Equipped with GPS, SPSS vessels navigate independently without need for external communication. They can cruise faster than eight knots Legislative debate over the DTVIA focused on the national security implications of difficult-to-detect platforms with extensive operational reach. 77 Representative Lungren, a sponsor of the bill, noted that "[t]he potential that someone might seek to import a weapon of mass destruction into the United States is perhaps of the greatest concern for us and why we need an aggressive response to alter the calculus of deterrence with respect to the use of these vehicles." 78 Representative Poe remarked:
The U.S. Coast Guard tells us at any given time, there are 100 . . . [SPSS vessels] on the high seas, all coming to the United States bringing drugs. . . . These things can bring in weapons of mass destruction, explosives, and work their way up the riverways of our Nation, going to our ports, like the Port of Houston and some of these other ports, and cause tremendous damage. We want to capture these people on the high seas before they get that opportunity.
79
Representative Poe, in a press statement, further noted:
Nothing prevents [the SPSS] from falling into the hands of terrorists . . . . If these vessels can carry 13 tons of cocaine, they can carry weapons of mass destruction just as easily. The uncontrolled environment in which these vessels operate is prime for an act of terrorism off our coasts. 80 but tend to operate at slower speeds to minimize wake detection. Such technological enhancements and tactics make the SPSS increasingly complex and better capable of defying surveillance and detection. Id. The go-fast is similar to a SPSS in that it is small, long, narrow, and constructed of fiber-glass, but unlike the SPSS, the go-fast can achieve speeds of eighty miles per hour. Some have said, why don't we just shoot them out of the water as soon as we see them? I guess we are too civilized for that. We want to prosecute them instead. This is important legislation. It will help our law enforcement guys, the Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, who are doing a tremendous job already in tracking these people, with cooperation from other navies throughout the world. It is time that we make this legislation law. President George W. Bush signed the DTVIA on October 13, 2008, culminating an unusually fast legislative response once the relevant threats and legal issues were identified. 81 The legislative history regarding the DTVIA emphasizes that SPSS platforms "pose a formidable security threat because they are difficult to detect and easy to scuttle or sink. These vessels therefore facilitate the destruction of evidence and hinder prosecution of smuggling offenses." 82 Moreover, "Congress determined to criminalize not only the underlying conduct-whatever that conduct may be-but also traveling on the vessel itself." 83 Thus, in passing the DTVIA, Congress emphasized the security threat posed by SPSS vessels:
Trafficking in controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious international problem, is universally condemned, and presents a threat to the security and societal well-being of the United States and . . . operating or embarking in a submersible vessel or semisubmersible vessel without nationality and on an international voyage is a serious international problem, facilitates transnational crime, including drug trafficking, and terrorism, and presents a specific threat to the safety of maritime navigation and the security of the United States. 84 Accordingly, the DTVIA amended 18 U.S.C. § 2285 and provides: Whoever knowingly operates, or attempts or conspires to operate, by any means, or embarks in any submersible vessel or semi-submersible vessel that is without nationality and that is navigating or has navigated into, through, or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single country or a lateral limit of that country's territorial sea with an adjacent country, with the intent to evade detection, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. The DTVIA also amended 46 U.S.C. § 70502 with the following definitions:
The term "semi-submersible vessel" means any watercraft constructed or adapted to be capable of operating with most of its hull and bulk under the surface of the water, including both manned and unmanned watercraft. . . . [T] he term "submersible vessel" means a vessel that is capable of operating completely below the surface of the water, including both manned and unmanned watercraft.
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The DTVIA addresses "evidence of intent to evade detection" by providing that the "presence of any of the indicia described in [various sections of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act] may be considered, in the totality of the circumstances, to be prima facie evidence of intent to evade detection."
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Additionally, the DTVIA also provides affirmative defenses, including that the vessel is: The DTVIA further provides that [t]he following indicia, among others, may be considered, in the totality of the circumstances, to be prima facie evidence that a vessel is intended to be used to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such an offense: (1) [t]he construction or adaptation of the vessel in a manner that facilitates smuggling, including-(A) the configuration of the vessel to ride low in the water or present a low hull profile to avoid being detected visually or by radar; . . . (E) the presence of materials used to reduce or alter the heat or radar signature of the vessel and avoid detection; . . . government-regulated or licensed activity, including commerce, research, or exploration; or (D) equipped with and using an operable automatic identification system, vessel monitoring system, or long range identification and tracking system.
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Enactment of the DTVIA involved the intersection of operational, legislative, and judicial interests. The DTVIA represents important statutory authority to confront an evolving, asymmetric, and transnational threat that previously eluded judicial consequences.
V. DTVIA PROSECUTIONS, LEGAL ISSUES, AND APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues raised by prosecutions brought under the DTVIA are similar to many raised by the MDLEA. Defendants have challenged the constitutionality of U.S. prosecutions of foreign defendants for conduct committed beyond the U.S. territorial seas on non-U.S.-flagged vessels; the scope and extent of congressional authority under the High Seas Clause of the Constitution; 89 and whether the burden of proof is unlawfully shifted to the defendant. 90 While not every legal issue related to DTVIA's constitutionality has been litigated, the cases discussed below represent the sole appellate reviews of the DTVIA and warrant examination.
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The defendants in Ibarguen-Mosquera were arrested after being detected by the United States Coast Guard Cutter Alert in international waters in 2009. 92 With a maritime patrol aircraft providing support, an approaching boarding team on a rigid-hull inflatable boat observed a "flash of light" and "smoke or steam" from the SPSS. "calmly exited the hatch, donned life-jackets, and inflated the liferafts." 94 Shortly thereafter, the SPSS sank and the crew awaited rescue.
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Unlike the interdiction off the El Salvador coast discussed in Part I, no drugs were recovered and the vessel was not retrieved; 96 thus, prior to DTVIA's enactment, the crew of this stateless vessel would likely have avoided prosecution. Instead, on January 13, 2009, the defendants were indicted on two counts of operating and conspiring to operate a semisubmersible vessel. 97 The trial court sentenced the defendants to confinement for 108 months.
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Three of the four appellants challenged their convictions, asserting the DTVIA is unconstitutional because:
(1) its enactment exceeds Congress's power under Article I; (2) the phrases "semi-submersible vessel" and "intent to evade" are unconstitutionally vague; (3) it shifts the burden "onto defendants to prove they are not engaging in drug trafficking and therefore denies them procedural due process; and (4) it is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest and therefore violates substantive due process. 99 Likewise, in United States v. Saac, the Eleventh Circuit considered a separate interdiction by the U.S. Coast Guard in international waters, where the crew of a SPSS also scuttled their vessel upon approach. 100 Here, too, the semi-submersible "lacked a flag, registration number, homeport, or navigational lights." 101 Consequently, the four defendants in Saac received 108 months confinement and raised similar appellate challenges as the defendants in Ibarguen-Mosquera. 102 The Saac and Ibarguen-Mosquera opinions were the first issued on the DTVIA in the Eleventh Circuit; as such, subsequent rulings in the Eleventh Circuit courts have held that challenges "are foreclosed by this Court's recently published opinions." 103 Accordingly, the remainder of this section shall focus primarily on analysis in Saac and IbarguenMosquera.
A. High Seas Clause Challenges
The Ibarguen-Mosquera court, which attached a vivid color picture of the aqua-blue, zero freeboard SPSS to its opinion, addressed the contention that Congress exceeded its power by broadly reading the High Seas Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes Congress to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations."
104
The scope of Article I, Section 8, along with the issue of a nexus requirement, has also been raised in appellant challenges to MDLEA convictions, where defendants have contended that Congress lacks the authority to criminalize foreign conduct on the high seas by foreigners on non-U.S.-flagged vessels outside the U.S. territorial sea. 106. Id. at 1204. See also id. at 1207-08 ("Congress has only those powers given to it. The question raised by the MDLEA is whether the Define and Punish Clause, and in particular its provisions for 'Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,' is an open-ended authorization for Congress to punish any crimes on the high seas and any offenses against the law of nations, regardless of whether they have a connection with the United States.").
Counsel for appellants in Ibarguen-Mosquera asserted that
[t]he United States Constitution simply does not allow Congress to punish wholly foreign conduct committed in foreign waters by foreign nationals on a foreign vessel. . . . Both the Third and Eleventh Circuits . . . suggest that there is a limit to Congress's High Seas power, and their reasoning indicates that the scope of the power must be a function of whether the conduct being regulated is generally recognized as a crime by law-abiding countries. Unlike drug trafficking, operating a semi-submersible vessel, with the intent to evade detection, has not been universally condemned.
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In Campaz-Guerrero Government counsel responded to similar challenges, arguing that
[i]n enacting the Act (DTVIA), Congress . . . exercised its power under the High Seas Clause, and it likewise did so narrowly, limiting the statute's reach to "vessels without nationality". . . . Any due process concerns in this case are satisfied by the "protective principle" of international law . . . [permitting] "a nation to assert jurisdiction over a person whose conduct outside the nation's territory threatens the nation's security or could potentially interfere with the operation of its governmental functions." 108 The Ibarguen-Mosquera court framed the issues as being "whether and in what circumstances Congress can grant extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign defendants traveling outside of the United States territorial waters." 109 The two requirements to enable a law to have extraterritorial effect are that: (1) Congress must have stated "that it intends the law to have extraterritorial effect" and (2) application of the law must not be "'arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.'" 110 18 U.S.C.A. § 2285(c) states: "There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offense under this section . . . ." Thus, the DTVIA's text explicitly provides clarity regarding Congressional intent on the issue of extraterritorial application.
The Saac court noted that "[t]hose who engage in conduct the DTVIA targets threaten our nation's security by evading detection while using submersible vessels to smuggle illegal drugs or other contraband, such as illegal weapons, from one country to another, and often into the United States." 111 The Saac court concluded that
Congress acted properly within its constitutional authority under the High Seas Clause in passing the DTVIA. The fact that defendants are challenging the constitutionality of a statute other than MDLEA does not alter our conclusion about the scope of Congress's power under the High Seas Clause. We declined to embellish one statute passed under the High Seas Clause with a nexus requirement. We now decline defendants' invitation to rewrite the Constitution to create one.
112
Ibarguen-Mosquera also examined the MDLEA, prior case law, and the status of vessels without nationality.
113 Vessels that are registered in a country fly the flag of that country and, as discussed above, are, as a general rule, subject to their exclusive jurisdiction. 114 The DTVIA proscribes submersibles that are stateless, or without nationality, operating internationally with the intent to evade detection. The Ibarguen-Mosquera court noted, "in the past we have held that the objective, protective, and territorial principles, have 'no applicability in connection with stateless vessels,' because such vessels are 'international pariahs,' that have, 'no internationally recognized right to navigate freely on the high seas.'"
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The Ibarguen-Mosquera court noted that "[b]ecause stateless vessels do not fall within the veil of another sovereign's territorial protection, all nations can treat them as their own territory and subject them to their laws." 116 The court in Ibarguen-Mosquera further noted "that international law permits any nation to subject stateless vessels on the guilty if there are indicia he is drug trafficking, unconstitutionally shifting the burden to him to prove he was not. . . ."
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The Ibarguen-Mosquera court noted that the Constitution prohibits presuming an ingredient of an offense upon the proof of other facts, or shifting certain elements of an offense from an element to an affirmative defense. The Constitution would therefore prohibit redefining an offense so that the absence of an element of the original crime becomes an affirmative defense.
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The court held, however, that this provision does not shift the burden onto Appellants for at least two reasons. First, that the design of the vessel can serve as prima facie evidence of intent to evade merely means that such evidence is legally sufficient to find such an intent, and does not shift the burden of persuasion onto Appellants. The government is still charged with convincing the fact-finder that the defendant intended to evade detection. Second, there is much more evidence here of "intent to evade" than merely the fact that the Vessel is semi-submersible: the Vessel's camouflage, its lack of headlights, its surreptitious route to the ocean, and its statelessness."
127
The Ibarguen-Mosquera court anchored its holding primarily on the fact that the DTVIA is not a drug-trafficking statute. 128 It is, after all, the DTVIA's text, not its title, which provides the substantive provisions. As Government counsel noted in their Campaz-Guerrero brief, "[d]espite . . . [the DTVIA's] popular name, . . . section 2285 is not a drug trafficking statute, and it does not prohibit drug trafficking." 129 DTVIA's national security underpinnings and its focus on the means of conveyance, not the cargo, were dispositive for the court:
While it is probably true that the DTVIA was enacted in part to deal with the problem of losing drug evidence to the sinking of 125 semi-submersibles, the DTVIA is not a drug-trafficking statute. In enacting the DTVIA, Congress chose to prohibit an entirely new evil, not to redefine an old one. 130 The DTVIA prosecutions over the past three years have demonstrated the value of legislation targeted against a transnational threat.
Closing the loophole that previously existed regarding submersibles is operationally beneficial and judicially sound. It is probable that those prosecuted under the DTVIA will continue to challenge its constitutionality, though the opinions in Saac and IbarguenMosquera are precedential Eleventh Circuit cases and will provide important guidance for other circuits.
VII. CONCLUSION
Transnational criminal threats are corrosive to stability, national security, and governance. The deployment of submersibles by TCOs poses a threat not just to the United States, but to all nations. While currently believed to be only carrying drugs and arms, TCOs could transport considerably more dangerous items, such as WMD, or even use the SPSS itself as a weapon. As such, Congress rightly criminalized stateless submersibles operating internationally with the intent to evade detection.
Appellate cases in 2011 affirming convictions under the DTVIA have demonstrably added to the law's authoritative force. 131 Nevertheless, defendants in subsequent prosecutions may very well revisit issues related to vagueness and burden shifting, among others. Neither contention should have legal resonance when the underlying conduct remains operating a stateless submersible internationally with an intent to evade detection.
As TCOs modify their tactics with potentially new platforms, courts may have to address whether those vessels fall under the ambit of the DTVIA. Policy questions include how U.S. agencies will prioritize the SPSS threat, the development of use of force guidance, potential efforts to recover scuttled vessels/cargo, fiscal issues and ensuring there are consequences for failing to heave to.
As states explore how to address maritime threats most effectively, it is important to assess them in the context of a continually changing environment, with the expectation that criminals and terrorists will develop new methods and new technology. An at-sea presence will remain critical to interdiction and apprehension efforts, but robust legal capabilities are also critical. 132 A gap that existed between an emergent transnational threat and the law was closed with the enactment of the DTVIA in 2008. As the transportation of narcotics and other illicit cargo continues to evolve, it will be critical that laws similarly evolve to support operations and ensure judicial accountability. 132 . See CRAIG H. ALLEN, MARITIME COUNTERPROLIFERATION OPERATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 80 (2007) ("Maritime interception and enforcement actions are an indispensable element in maintaining order in the oceans. No one has yet suggested a feasible substitute for an adequate and effective at-sea monitoring and enforcement presence.").
